

TOP SECRET

FEB 9 1952

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FEC -9 TT 5073 23 AUG 51 JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
 REF DA 99027 16 AUG

EXCEPTIONS TAKEN BY DIRECTORS OF CIA & ONI THAT ATK ON JAPAN UNLIKELY IN EVENT USSR RESORTS TO GEN WAR DO NOT AGREE WITH CONSIDERED VIEWS OF THIS HQ. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT PRIMARY SOVIET EFFORT LAUNCHED IN EUROPE ON START OF WW III, IT IS FIRMLY BELVD THAT DETERMINED & PROBABLY VONCURRENT EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO SEIZE JAP ISLES & THAT THIS OPN DEFINITELY WOULD BE IN SUFFICIENT FORCE TO IMPERIL PSN OF FEC, AS NOW CONSTITUTED.

SOV FAR EAST SURFACE FLEET WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SUFFER LOSSES IN SUCH EFFORT. HOWEVER, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT OVERWHELMING NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF SOV FAR EAST ARM, & DIVERSIFICATION OF OPNAL EFFORT REQUIRED OF OUR OWN AF IN A GEN WAR WOULD PRECLUDE DESTRUCTION OF SOV NAVAL FORCES. ALSO, POTENTIAL OF SOV FAR EAST SUBMARINE FLEET, COMPARATIVELY OF MUCH GREATER STR THAN SURFACE FLEET & FAR LESS VULNERABLE, MUST REC SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

IN LIGHT OF CURR SOV POLICIES & PRACTICES IN PROVIDING WAR MAT TO COMM CHINA, IT IS BELVD THAT POSS OF FURTHER CURTAILMENT, RESULTING FROM CONCERTED EFFORT AGAINST JAPAN, WOULD NOT DETER SOV IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH PLANS. ENERGETIC COMM STOCKPILING OF NEC WAR MATS HAS BEEN NOTED FOR SOME TIME THRU-OUT FAR EAST. WHILE ATK ON JAPAN WOULD OBVIOUSLY CAUSE SOME DIMINUTION OF AMT OF SUPS FLOWING TO COMM CHINA, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PRESENT STOCKS ARE SUFFICIENT FOR SUCH OPN WITHOUT ANY APPRECIABLE INITIAL EFFECT ON KOREAN EFFORT, OR ON OTHER OFFS WHICH MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN ELSEWHERE IN SE ASIA. THE POSS OF CAPTURING US/UN & JAP SUPS WOULD UNDOUBTED Y TECD TO INDUCE SUCH AN ATK. ALSO POSSIBLE THAT USE OF JAP TECH KNOWLEDGE & ABILITY IN BACKWARD INDUSTRIES OF COMM ASIA WOULD BE EFFECTED WITH SUCH CELERITY AS TO MORE THAN OFFSET OPENING CURTAILMENT OF SUPS RESULTING FROM CONCURRENT OPNS.

determined that

☐ CIA has no objection to declass
 if contains information of CIA
 interest that must remain
 classified at TS S 0

TOP SECRET

PAGE 2 - COPY

DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE HOW SEIZURE OF JAP ISLANDS WOULD EXPOSE MANCHURIA & MARITIME PROV. ON CONTRARY, IT IS FELT THAT SUCH ASSUMPTION OF INITIATIVE, REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME, WOULD SERVE MATERIALLY TO BOLSTER OVER-ALL COMMUNIST PSN IN FE. AVAL UN FORCES, IF SUCCESSFUL IN REPULSING INVASION OF JAPAN, ARE NOT DEEMED ADEQUATE TO INFLICT IRREPARABLE LOSSES ON SOV POTENTIAL: CERTAINLY NOT TO EXTENT WHICH WOULD POSE ANY IMMEDIATE THREAT TO MANCHURIA OR MARITIME PROV.

ANOTHER COGENT CONSIDERATION IS THAT ASSAULT ON JAPAN WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE INADVISABLE THE W/D OF ANY MIL UNITS DEPLOYED IN FE FOR COUNTERING THRUSTS WHICH MAY BE MADE ELSEWHERE IN WORLD. MOREOVER, BEYOND PINNING DOWN FORCES ALREADY COMMITTED IN THEATER, REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED IN FEC, WOULD LIKEWISE BE DENIED EMPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE.

IN ADDITION, HERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SOVS RECOGNIZE THAT WITHOUT CONTROLLING JAPAN, REST OF FE CAN NEVER BE SECURED. DEFINITELY, THEY MUST RECOGNIZE THAT JAPAN, WITH GREATEST INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL & LARGEST SOURCE OF TRAINED, EXPERIENCED TECHNICIANS IN ORIENT, CONSTITUTES PRIZE WHICH COULD BE READILY EXPLOITED FOR SOV GLOBL OBJECTIVES - A PRIZE WORTH EXPENDITURE OF CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF MEN AND MAT.

(END FEC-9)

TOP SECRET

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Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000400050001-0

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MEMORANDUM TO: General Smith

Noted by DCI
8/23

Attached is FECOM's comments on our
SE 11, "Probability Soviet Attack on
Japan Prior End of 1951".

*Noted - send
to Allen & Estimate
HJM*

23 Aug 51
(DATE)

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FORM NO. 10-101 OCT 1950